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1.   Introduction 
 
The reform I propose in this paper involves mandating Environmental Management 
Systems (EMSs) via company law.  I use the EUÕs voluntary Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme (EMAS) as an example of what the legal regulation of EMSs might 
look like.  The aim of a mandatory EMS would be to open up a deliberative space 
within corporations for the vocalisation and expression of environmental concerns, or 
to ÔamplifyÕ what I term Ôintra-corporate environmental voiceÕ.  This, in turn, offers a 
way in which to achieve the more meaningful integration1 of environmental concerns 
within both company law and company decision-making than is presently the case in 
the UK. As I explain, the integration of environmental concerns under section 
172(1)(d) Companies Act (CA) 2006 is somewhat weak, principally because it allows 
only a Ôbusiness caseÕ approach to the value of environmental protection,2 the likely 
effect of which is to ÔmuteÕ rather than amplify environmental voice.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I explain the reasons for this 
particular reform proposal.  As will be seen, properly designed procedural regulation 
may serve to amplify whispers of environmental voice existing within companies, but 
section 172 is unlikely to achieve this. In section 3, I outline EMAS as an example of 
the legal regulation of EMSs, and explain its superiority over section 172 as a potential 
way to amplify environmental voice. In section 4, I briefly make the reform proposal, 
                                               
* I am indebted to David Kershaw, Maria Lee, Marc Moore and Joanne Scott for detailed comments and 
interesting discussion on an earlier (and longer) version of this paper. I am also grateful to the Company 
Law section of the 2013 Society of Legal Scholars (SLS) Annual Conference, for lively debate on a 
similar paper. 
1 See Beate Sjfjell, Towards a Sustainable European Company Law: A Normative Analysis of the 
Objectives of EU Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009). 
2 And as I have argued elsewhere, see Carrie Bradshaw, ÔThe Environmental Business Case and 
Unenlightened Shareholder ValueÕ (2013) 33(1) Legal Studies 141. 
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2 
namely, that responsibility for Ôinstituting and ensuring the proper implementation of 
an environmental management systemÕ should be mandated via the existing codified 
regime of directorsÕ duties. I then address some of the legitimate concerns that 
mandating EMSs might be ineffective or counter-productive.  
 
 
2. Reasons for reform 
 
The organisational muting of environmental voice3 
 The need for environmental ÔvoiceÕ, either within the company or outside, 
stems from the fact that unlike other corporate ÔstakeholdersÕ such as shareholders, 
employees, consumers or the local community, the environment cannot speak for 
itself.4  It requires advocates to voice its interests on its behalf. The starting point in 
locating environmental voice within companies, or in locating intra-corporate 
environmental voice, is the real individuals who comprise business organisations.  
Whispers of this voice can be heard in the normative or internalised commitments to 
environmental protection uncovered in the environmental compliance literature.  
However, as will be seen, a range of organisational factors can serve to ÔmuteÕ the 
expression of non-financial or counter-hegemonic views within companies, including 
environmental concerns.  
 Traditionally, compliance or non-compliance with regulatory obligations was 
explained by reference to the economic deterrence model of behaviour,5 which 
assumes that individuals and businesses will only undertake environmental protection 
measures when required by law.6  However, the deterrence model does not stand up to 
empirical scrutiny. More recent compliance research uncovers a pluralistic and 
complex account of motivations for environmental compliance.  In addition to 
economic costs, there are also ÔsocialÕ and ÔnormativeÕ motivations for pro-
environmental behaviour,7 both of which challenge the economic model of both 
                                               
3 The following section is a very brief summary of the sixth chapter of my doctoral thesis, Corporations, 
Responsibility and the Environment (UCL, 2013).  
4 See, for example, Christopher D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects (Tahoe City, CA: Tioga Books, 1988). 
5 See, for example, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation : Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
6 See Robert A Kagan, Neil Gunningham and Dorothy Thornton, ÔFear, duty, and regulatory 
compliance: lessons from three research projectsÕ in Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen 
(eds), Explaining Regulatory Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2011), p 39; Robert A Kagan and John T Scholz, ÔThe ÒCriminology of the CorporationÓÕ in 
Keith Hawkins and John Thomas (eds), Enforcing Regulation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 
1984); Anthony Ogus and Carolyn Abbot, ÔSanctions for Pollution: Do We Have The Right Regime?Õ 
(2002) 14 Journal of Environmental Law 283. 
7 Parker and Nielsen, ÔIntroductionÕ (n 6), pp 10-12; Kagan et al, ÔRegulatory complianceÕ (n 6), pp 37-
9. 
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3 
individual and firm behaviour.8  For present purposes, I am interested in the third 
broad motivation for compliance behaviourÑnormativity.  Normative motivations 
encompass internalised commitments to environmental compliance and environmental 
protection more broadly.9  Of course, normative motivations are idiosyncratic.  For 
example, responses appear to be influenced by personality traits, allowing for 
differences in emotionality or morality.10  Nonetheless, normative motivations for 
complying with environmental regulation are found consistently to exist, suggesting 
that there is at least some genuine concern for the environment within corporationsÑ
that there are ÔwhispersÕ of intra-corporate environmental voice.   
  However, it is relatively uncontroversial that an individualÕs values, 
environmental or otherwise, are affected by group membership.11  That individuals are 
able to freely exercise and vocalise personal values in the corporate setting is Ôbelied 
by both psychology and sociologyÕ.12  For a number of reasons, organisational life 
suppresses or constrains individualsÕ own sense of conscience, in turn having the 
powerful potential to mute intra-corporate environmental voice as well as being a well-
known underlying factor in incidents of corporate irresponsibility. For example, the 
psychologist John Darley, in analysing the various ways that corporations can 
encourage wrongdoing, cites the diffusion of responsibility felt in group scenarios.13  
The organisational setting can ÔdistanceÕ oneÕs actions from decisions, particularly in 
large institutions; when many are involved in decision-making, Ônone feels personal 
responsibility for the ultimate outcomeÕ.14  Various psychological phenomena have 
been identified regarding organisational or group decision-making, such as Ôrisk shiftÕ 
(taking riskier decisions because it is on behalf of an organisation), ÔgroupthinkÕ 
(acting in accordance with organisational norms despite inconsistency with oneÕs own 
values) and the ÔAbilene paradoxÕ (agreeing to group decisions against oneÕs better 
                                               
8 Kagan et al, ÔRegulatory complianceÕ (n 6), p 4; see also Peter J May and Soren C Winter, ÔRegulatory 
enforcement styles and complianceÕ in Parker and Nielsen, Explaining Regulatory Compliance (n 6). 
9 See Kagan et al, ÔRegulatory complianceÕ (n 6) and Dorothy Thornton, Neil Gunningham and Robert 
Kagan, Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
10 Jennifer Howard-Grenville, Jennifer Nash and Cary Coglianese, ÔConstructing the License to Operate: 
Internal Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental DecisionsÕ (2008) 30 Law & Policy 
73. 
11 Larry May, The Socially Responsive Self: Social Theory and Professional Ethics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), p 6. 
12 Lawrence E Mitchell and Theresa A Gabaldon, ÔIf I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify 
Corporate MoralityÕ (2001) 76 Tulane Law Review 1645. 
13 John M Darley, ÔHow Organizations Socialize Individuals into EvildoingÕ in David M. Messick and 
Ann E. Tenbrunsel (eds), Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research into Business Ethics (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1996). 
14 Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex 
Organisations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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judgment in order to avoid conflict).15  As such, people can Ôin concertÕ behave in 
ways that they would never have found acceptable otherwise.16   
 Perhaps the most obvious cause of muted values in the workplace is economic 
vulnerability, especially if the individual has dependants.17  The business ethics 
literature is riddled with narratives of would-be whistle-blowers, who feared that 
acting according to their own values would lead to job loss or impede career 
development.18  Underpinning this vulnerability is the strict notion of hierarchy and 
authority which characterises business corporations: ÔWhat is right in the corporation 
is not what is right in a manÕs home É  What is right in the corporation is what the 
guy above you wants from you.Õ19 So whilst individuals outside of the corporate 
setting may have multiple standards against which to judge their conduct, individual 
actors in corporations Ôare subsumed and socialised by organisational bureaucraciesÕ.20  
As such, organisations can thus cause people to ÔbracketÕ in the workplace any private 
values they might hold.21 So whist the environmental compliance literature may 
provide us with whispers of intra-corporate environmental voice, a range of 
organisational and hierarchical factors present within the company can serve to ÔmuteÕ 
this voice.   
 As will be seen, EMSs institute a series of discursive and iterative processes 
which may have the potential to limit some of these organisational, muting factors, in 
turn opening up space within the corporation for the expression of environmental 
voice. Like section 172 CA 2006, EMSs are a form of procedural law, to which we 
now turn. 
 
Section 172 CA 2006: proceduralisation and the environmental business case  
 EMSs are a type of regulatory tool referred to variously as procedural law, 
meta-regulation and reflexive law.22  Such regulatory strategies focus on harnessing 
                                               
15 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p 33.  See also Ronald R Sims, Ethics and Organizational Decision 
Making: A Call for Renewal (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994). 
16 Christopher D Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (New York: 
Harper and Row 1975), p 5; May, The Socially Responsive Self (n 11), p 70. 
17 May, The Socially Responsive Self (n 11). 
18 See Kermit Vandivier, ÔWhy Should My Conscience Bother Me?Õ in M David Ermann and Richard J 
Lundman (eds), Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in 
Contemporary Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Frederick Bruce Bird, The Muted 
Conscience: Moral Silence and the Practice of Ethics in Business (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
2002); Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
19 Jackall, Moral Mazes (n 18), p 11. 
20 Parker, The Open Corporation (n 15), p 33.  See also Lawrence E Mitchell, Corporate 
Irresponsibility: AmericaÕs Newest Export (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp 43-5.  
21 Jackall, Moral Mazes (n 18), p 4. 
22 These types of regulation find their theoretical origin in the work of Gunther Teubner, see, for 
example, ÔSubstantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern LawÕ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 
239; ÔJuridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, SolutionsÕ in Gunther Teubner (ed), Juridification of 
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5 
and enhancing the self-referential and self-regulating capacities of institutions outside 
of the legal system towards those external public policy goals.23  But rather than 
attempting direct ÔcontrolÕ through highly detailed substantive standards, procedural 
approaches are indirect mechanisms and structures which, in the context of 
environmental protection, encourage and engender environmental responsibility.24  
Such regulation seeks to create the structural conditions for Ôorganisational 
conscienceÕ, establishing self-reflective processes to ÔirritateÕ businesses into creative, 
critical and continual thinking about how to minimise environmental harms.25  In the 
language used above, they provide frameworks for the expression of environmental 
voice. 
Christine ParkerÕs work on the relationship between procedural forms of law 
(particularly meta-regulation) and corporate responsibility offers a powerful basis for 
assessing existing and proposed corporate environmental procedures specifically.  
According to Parker, such regulation should be structured so that companies engage 
with external norms and values; that is, the types of norms and values which the 
organisational aspects of companies can mute.26  So in the context of environmental 
proceduralisation, the aim is for companies to engage with the norms and values 
associated with environmental protection.27 This engagement should also be in a 
manner which transcends their own corporate self-interest.  This envisages the 
institutionalisation of corporate structures, cultures and management which are ÔopenÕ 
or ÔpermeableÕ to environmental values and the ways in which these may conflict with 
other (financial) corporate goals.   In the context of regulating for environmental 
purposes, therefore, such regulation should involve frameworks where business 
enterprises put themselves through an environmental process oriented to 
environmental outcomes.28 At the same time, and in the spirit of procedural 
approaches generally, such legal interventions should leave the greatest amount of 
                                                                                                                                        
Social Spheres - A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare 
(Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1987).  
23 Eric W Orts, ÔReflexive Environmental LawÕ (1994) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1227, 
pp 1231-2; Julia Black, ÔDecentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a ÒPost-RegulatoryÓ WorldÕ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103, p 111. 
24 See Orts, ÔReflexive Environmental LawÕ (n 23), pp 1231-2; Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer and 
Declan Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: Concept and Practice of 
Ecological Self-Organisation (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1994); Neil Gunningham, ÔThe New 
Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of RegulationÕ (2009) 36 Journal of Law 
and Society 145. 
25 Julia Black, ÔProceduralising Regulation: Part IÕ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597, p 
603; Orts, ÔReflexive Environmental LawÕ (n 23), pp 1231-2. 
26 Christine Parker, ÔMeta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social ResponsibilityÕ in 
Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p 215. 
27 See also Sanford E Gaines and Clona Kimber, ÔRedirecting Self‐RegulationÕ (2001) 13 Journal of 
Environmental Law 157, pp 169-70 and Leonie Breunung and Joachim Nocke, ÔEnvironmental Officers: 
a Viable Concept for Ecological Management?Õ in Teubner et al, Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility (n 24). 
28 Parker, The Open Corporation (n 15), p 237. 
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space possible for companies to work out how to meet their own goals, but within the 
framework of values set down by regulation.29 
Section 172(1)(d) CA 2006 might be regarded as a form of 
corporate/environmental proceduralisation.30  It requires that directors, in promoting 
the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole, have regard 
to the impact of the companyÕs operations on the environment.  However, for a 
number of reasons, section 172 integrates environmental concerns in to corporate 
decision-making in only a weak way; it provides space for the expression of a 
financially contingent (rather than ÔnormativeÕ or ÔinternalisedÕ) form of environmental 
voice.  This is because, as I have argued elsewhere, section 172 mandates a procedural 
Ôbusiness caseÕ for corporate environmental responsibility.31  Directors are required to 
have regard to the environment only to the extent that doing so will promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders. It does not permit profit-
sacrificing in the name of the environment, but rather forces decision-making 
procedures towards looking for corporate / environmental Ôwin-winsÕ. 
The rhetoric of the environmental business caseÑthe idea that behaving 
environmentally responsibly ÔpaysÕÑis, for obvious reasons, highly seductive.  But 
empirical evidence to this effect is elusive.  Despite a large body of empirical research 
on the topic, no consensus emerges as to the existence of a generalised link between 
corporate responsibility (environmental, or otherwise) and corporate financial 
performance.32 Marc OrlitzkyÕs meta-analysis suggests that corporate environmental 
performance seems negligibly but nonetheless positively related to business 
performance.33 However, not only is this relationship very slight in any event, there are 
                                               
29 Ibid., p 217. 
30 It should be noted that s 172 is accompanied by an environmental reporting requirement, formerly 
known as the s 417 CA 2006 business review (many of these requirements are replicated, with some 
additions, in the new Ôstrategic reportÕ, see the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and DirectorsÕ 
Report) Regulations 2013). Given the short length of this paper, as well as the fact that other conference 
participants will be addressing the issue of sustainability reporting, I do not go in to any detail in this 
regard. For further analysis, see Bradshaw, Corporations, Responsibility and the Environment (n 3), Ch 
7; Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Reporting and Company Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Iris HY Chiu, ÔThe Paradigms of Mandatory Non-financial Disclosure: a Conceptual Analysis: 
Part 1Õ [2006] Company Lawyer 259. 
31 Bradshaw, ÔThe Environmental BusinessÕ (n 2).  
32 The literature is extensive, a review of which is beyond the scope of this paper.  See further 
Bradshaw, ÔThe Environmental Business CaseÕ (n 2), pp 144-7; Jos Allouche and Patrick Laroche, 
ÔThe Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Environmental 
ResponsibilityÕ in Jos Allouche (ed), Corporate Social Responsibility (Volume 2) Ð Performances and 
Stakeholders (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Marc Orlitzky, ÔCorporate Social Performance 
and Financial Performance: A Research SynthesisÕ in Andrew Crane and others (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Joshua D 
Margolis and James P Walsh, People and Profits?: The Search for a Link Between a CompanyÕs Social 
and Financial Performance (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001). 
33 Orlitzky, ÔCorporate Social PerformanceÕ (n 32), p 14. 
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7 
a number of reasons for scepticism as to the empirical basis for the environmental 
business case, not least a string of methodological concerns.34 
Perhaps more problematically, the business case claim suggests that 
corporate/environmental win-win situations exist as a matter of course.  The ready or 
easy compatibility of environmental and economic concerns is taken as a starting 
point, and this starting point is problematic: trade-offs and points of conflict between 
environmental and corporate-economic goals do, and will continue, to exist.35  
Furthermore, many of these trade-offs are deeply embedded in business practice and 
societal interactions, the reversal of which would require significant behavioural 
change.36  With this in mind, the rhetoric of the business case, and hence the whole 
norm underpinning section 172(1)(d) CA 2006, sends a misleading and unhelpful 
message regarding the effort required to ensure environmental protection.  Indeed, 
section 172, in procedurally mandating (and not permitting anything more than) a 
search for environmental and corporate-economic win-wins, has the potential to shut 
down all of the tensions that exist between environmental and corporate goals.   
For John Parkinson, this is not necessarily problematic.37  The aim of section 
172-type requirements is to institute the ÔsocialisationÕ or ÔsensitisationÕ of boardroom 
decision-making by requiring directors to reflect on the consequences for corporate 
actions; all in the hope that a better balancing of company and external interests will 
result.38  But we should consider this claim against the thrust of regulatory scholarship, 
particularly Christine ParkerÕs prescriptions for robust procedural interventions.  
Section 172 provides only instrumental relevance to environmental concerns in terms 
of a goal of corporate success, rather than a procedure geared towards an 
environmental norm.  In addition, the business case approach to decision-making 
under section 172 provides ample scope for the masking of environmental and 
corporate conflict, despite calls for procedural interventions to leave space for such 
conflicts to emerge. Insofar as section 172 assumes away conflicts in decision-making 
and provides space for only a financially contingent environmental voice, it seems 
arguable that few regulatory scholars would be convinced that section 172 encourages 
deep or deliberative reflection on corporate environmental impacts. Indeed, if 
anything, section 172 has the scope to mute rather than amplify the whispers of 
environmental voice seen in the environmental compliance literature.  This is 
particularly the case given it requires consideration of the benefits of environmental 
protection in terms of benefits to the company, rather than environmental protection as 
a valuable goal in and of itself.  
                                               
34 See above (n 32). 
35 Bradshaw, ÔThe Environmental Business CaseÕ (n 2). 
36 Ibid. 
37 JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp 345-6. 
38 Ibid., pp 345-6; see also Lawrence E Mitchell, ÔThe board as a path toward corporate social 
responsibilityÕ in McBarnet et al, The New Corporate Accountability (n 26). 
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3. Environmental management systems  
 
In this section, I outline a more robust and holistic form of corporate environmental 
procedure than section 172: environmental management systems (EMSs).  Properly 
instituted, EMSs seek to embed environmental considerations within corporate 
decision-making and operations, in turn implicating and drawing in participation from 
employees at various levels of hierarchy. Crucially, there is no ÔsingleÕ EMS template.  
An EMS is generated by a corporation itself, and tailored to its own organisational 
needs. Whilst the specific shape and structure of an EMS will therefore vary across 
companies, there are some commonalities.  EMSs tend to consist of a series of internal 
planning processes, all of which are designed and implemented to achieve certain 
environmental goals.  These goals include ensuring regulatory compliance, as well as 
improving the companyÕs overall environmental performance.  Employees at various 
levels of hierarchy will be trained and assigned responsibility for implementing parts 
of the plan, which in turn will be reviewed and audited internally and externally.  The 
results of review and audit should be fed back into a process of revision and 
continuous improvement to the overall EMS, with any deficiencies made the subject of 
remedial action in accordance a Ôplan-do-check-actÕ cycle.39 
 Despite EMSs being tailor-made by the organisation itself, frameworks are 
available to corporations to assist in the preparation of their own EMS, sometimes 
coupled with additional requirements for external validation or certification.  Most 
prominent is the ISO 14001 EMS standard, developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO).40  This EMS has now been incorporated into 
the EUÕs more exacting Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS III).41  Both 
standards directly compete with one another on a global stage, since EMAS 
registration is available to non-EU corporations.42 As already stated, EMAS operates 
                                               
39 Cary Coglianese, ÔThe Managerial Turn in Environmental PolicyÕ (2008) 17 NYU Environmental Law 
Journal 54, pp 55-6.  See also Leigh Holland and Yee Boon Foo, ÔDifferences in environmental 
reporting practices in the UK and the US: the legal and regulatory contextÕ (2003) 35 The British 
Accounting Review 1, p 5; Michael Watson and Anthony RT Emery, ÔLaw, economics and the 
environment: A comparative study of environmental management systemsÕ (2004) 19 Managerial 
Auditing Journal 760, p 762. 
40 In 2008, an estimated 188,000 companies from 155 countries were certified as ISO 14001 compliant; 
see Coglianese, ÔThe Managerial TurnÕ (n 39), p 56; Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski, The 
Voluntary Environmentalists: Green Clubs, ISO 14001, and Voluntary Environmental Regulations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
41 Regulation (EC) 1221/2009 on the voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-
management and audit scheme (EMAS), Art 4(1)(b) and Annex II. As of 30 March 2012, more than 
4,600 companies and 7,800 sites were registered with EMAS, although only 59 organisations and 289 
sites were registered in the UK; cf with Germany, where registration figures were 1348 and 1877, 
respectively.  See <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/pictures/Stats/2012-
03_Overview_of_the_take-up_of_EMAS_in_the_participating_countries.jpg> (accessed 30 July, 2013). 
42 EMAS, Art 1. 
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on a voluntary basis, so that firms may opt to ÔregisterÕ for EMAS registration as a way 
in which to differentiate themselves (on an environmental basis) from competitors. In 
the following section, I briefly outline the requirements of the EMAS Regulation in 
order to provide a flavour of what the legal regulation of an EMS looks like.  I then 
consider the relationship between EMSs and intra-corporate environmental voice, and 
highlight the superiority of EMSs over section 172 for amplifying this voice.  
 
The EMAS Regulation 
In order to receive EMAS registration, firms must first carry out an 
environmental review.  This involves a comprehensive analysis of the firmÕs 
environmental impacts and its environmental performance and management.43 On the 
basis of the environmental review, they must then develop and implement an 
environmental management system meeting the requirements of ISO 14001.44  Central 
to the management system is the organisationÕs environmental policy.45  This is 
formally expressed by top management, and provides the overall environmental 
intention and direction of the organisation, outlining detailed (and where practical, 
quantifiable) objectives and targets.46  This self-setting of performance targets is a 
crucial aspect of EMAS, but it is important to reiterate that EMAS itself does not 
specify levels of performance; the firm to determines its own environmental 
performance objectives. The environmental policy should be communicated to 
employees and made available to the public.47   
The management system sets up and outlines the programmes for 
implementing the environmental policy and is based around the Ôplan-do-check-actÕ 
methodology.48  It should designate responsibility for achieving targets at appropriate 
levels and functions within the company, including a top management 
representative(s) responsible for implementing and reporting on the performance of the 
system.49  In addition, EMAS outlines requirements for employee involvement and 
participation, acknowledging that active employee involvement is a driving force and 
prerequisite for continuous environmental improvement.50  Management should in turn 
ensure the availability of necessary resources (financial, expertise, training where 
appropriate etc) to establish, implement, improve and monitor the EMS.51 
                                               
43 EMAS, Art 2.  
44 EMAS, Art 4 and Annex II. 
45 EMAS, Art 2 and Annex II. 
46 EMAS, Art 2. 
47 The policy is made public as part of the environmental statement (see below), EMAS, Art 2. 
48 I.e. a description of the measures, responsibilities and means taken or envisaged to achieve 
environmental objectives, targets and the deadlines thereof (EMAS, Art 2 and Annex II). 
49 EMAS, Annex II. 
50 Ibid.  On the importance of employee involvement at all levels of hierarchy, see Bradshaw, 
Corporations, Responsibility and the Environment (n 3), Chs 6-7. 
51 Ibid. 
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 Firms must also carry out an internal environmental audit, both before 
registration and at least every three years.52  The audit is a systematic evaluation of 
environmental performance, as well as compliance and conformity with the 
environmental policy and management system.53  Information on the results of audits 
should be provided to top management, who in turn should subject the EMS, and 
general environmental performance of the organisation, to periodic review.54  All of 
this should be documented, accompanied by systems of document creation, control and 
review, and accompanied by procedures for internal communication.55  This in turn 
assists firms in their preparation of a comprehensive environmental statement made 
publicly available (in essence, this is a reporting requirement).56  The statement reports 
on both the environmental policy and the management system, necessarily detailing 
environmental impacts, programme, objectives, targets and performance, all reported 
against key environmental performance indicators (KEPIs).  In order to receive EMAS 
registration from a competent body,57 the environmental review, management system, 
policy, internal audit and statement, as well as the organisationÕs continuous 
environmental improvement, must be annually validated as compliant with the EMAS 
Regulation by an accredited verifier.58 
 
The relationship between EMSs and muted/amplified environmental voice 
 The framework set up by EMAS, which requires companies to embed recursive 
and reflective processes within their decision-making, seems particularly appropriate 
for opening up deliberative space within the company for the expression of 
environmental concerns.  It envisages a Ôfundamental structural change in the everyday 
life of business institutions É [aiming at] the transformation of business culture.Õ59 A 
recent study based on interviews with Israeli corporations adopting an ISO 14001 
EMS (which now forms part of EMAS) provides evidence of the powerful potential of 
EMSs in this regard.60  Perez et alÕs research suggests that an environmental 
                                               
52 This is four years for those with a small organisation derogation (EMAS, Art 7 and Annex II). There 
are also specific matters to be taken into account when verifying small organisations. 
53 EMAS, Arts 4 and 9 and Annex III 
54 EMAS, Annex II. 
55 Ibid. 
56 EMAS, Arts 2 and 4 and Annex IV. 
57 Registration is renewed every three years. Any substantial changes require an additional review, with 
changes and updates to the environmental policy, programme, system and statement accordingly, see 
EMAS, Arts 4-6, 8 and 13-14. 
58 EMAS, Arts 2 and 18-20, and Chs V-VI generally. 
59 Orts, ÔReflexive Environmental LawÕ (n 23), p 1313; Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, 
ÔEnvironmental Management Systems and the New Policy AgendaÕ in Cary Coglianese and Jennifer 
Nash (eds), Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy 
Goals? (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 2001), pp 11-2; Edgar H Schein, ÔComing to a New 
Awareness of Organizational CultureÕ (1984) 25 Sloan Management Review 3. 
60 Oren Perez, Yair Amichai-Hamburger, and Tammy Shterental, ÔThe Dynamic of Corporate Self-
Regulation: ISO 14001, Environmental Commitment, and Organizational Citizenship BehaviorÕ (2009) 
43 Law & Society Review 593. 
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management system, through the various new routines it introduces to a companyÕs 
decision-making, can trigger positive changes in the companyÕs internal dynamic.  The 
routines of information generation, ordering and review ensure that environmental 
concerns Ôreceive stronger presence in the firmÕs decision making processes, allowing 
for the discursive expression of motivations and ideas that may have been suppressedÕ 
without a rigorous EMS.61  An EMS facilitates a shift into a Ônew dynamic 
equilibriumÕ, where environmental concerns are given more weight.62  The various 
recursive processes aimed at continual improvement provide a framework for 
involving employees in the environmental aspects of the organisation, in turn opening 
up space for the internalisation of environmental imperatives by employees and 
strengthening any intrinsic (normative or internalised) pro-environmental attitudes that 
might already have been held.63   
 Importantly, while a firm obviously carries out certain profit-orientated cost-
benefit analyses, an economic calculus will not necessarily be determinative where an 
EMS is in place; Perez et alÕs findings challenge assumptions that internal firm 
dynamics are entirely dominated by the logic of profit maximisation.64  This of course 
has implications for scholars concerned that the profit motive of corporations leads to 
the occlusion of environmental or other social / ethical concerns.  Key to this, they 
argued, was the way in which the EMS, by imposing a process of continual reflection, 
coupled with third-party auditing and certification, makes environmental issues more 
salient.  This salience, or the weight attached environmental issues, forces 
organisations to Ôdeal with competing (internal) economic and environmental demands 
and to develop new mechanisms for resolving potential tensions between them.Õ65  
While an environmental management system does not offer a complete algorithm for 
resolving these conflicts, the processes instituted created more environmentally 
ÔsensitiveÕ mechanisms to address such tensions.66 
 
Revisiting section 172 
 In comparison to section 172, it is clear that EMAS is a more robust and 
detailed procedure, and much more akin to the type of proceduralisation familiar to 
environmental lawyers.67  EMAS requires and provides the framework for the 
generation not only of a tailored environmental management system which details 
structures, plans, activities, practices and resources for addressing environmental 
                                               
61 Ibid., p 598. 
62 See also Kathleen M Eisenhardt and Jeffrey A Martin, ÔDynamic capabilities: what are they?Õ (2000) 
21 Strategic Management Journal 1105. 
63 Perez et al, ÔThe Dynamic of Corporate Self-RegulationÕ (n 60), pp 599-600. 
64 Ibid., p 620. 
65 Ibid., p 598. 
66 Ibid., p 620.  
67 For example, Environmental Impact Assessment, see Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The 
Regulation of Decision Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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issues, but also the generation of a top-level environmental policy and an initial 
environmental review.  Importantly, the environmental policy under EMAS requires 
corporations, top-management specifically, to set environmental goals in the form of 
measurable environmental performance targets and objectives.  In view of ParkerÕs call 
for environmental processes geared towards environmental norms, this is significant, 
and of course lacking under section 172, where the norm to which the process is 
geared is non-environmental. 
 In addition, it would seem that a rigorous and mandatory EMS would provide 
more salience to environmental issues than section 172, in turn suggesting the opening 
up of space within the corporation for the expression of environmental voice.  Recall 
how the various recursive and iterative processes associated with an EMS can ensure 
that environmental concerns are given more weight, in turn allowing for the type of 
discursive expression of varying motivations and ideas that would in theory be 
suppressed by the financially contingent form of environmental voice required by 
section 172.  Importantly, a continual process of reflection seemed to create more 
environmentally sensitive mechanisms to address competing and conflicting economic 
and environmental demands. EMSs thus are, as appropriate, open to corporate / 
environmental conflicts.  This should be contrasted with the weak form of 
environmental integration under section 172. Here, business case logic shuts down 
various tensions and conflicts by tunnelling decision-making towards locating 
corporate / environmental win-wins. As a means by which to encourage deliberative 
reflection on environmental impacts, and to achieve a stronger and more holistic form 
of environmental integration within company law than section 172, EMSs would thus 
seem to have much to offer.  
 
 
4. The reform proposal 
 
As already mentioned, the reform I propose is mandating environmental management 
systems via company law.  There is of course legislative detail which would be 
necessary for the institution of a mandatory EMS.  A full consideration of this is 
beyond the scope of this work and, of course, more appropriately addressed via 
consultation processes.  However, the EMAS Regulation provides a useful example of 
the legal regulation of EMSs. I do not suggest that the EMAS Regulation should 
necessarily be transplanted in its entirety, nor indeed do I suggest that EMAS is the 
only model.  Outlining EMAS above serves an illustrative rather than prescriptive 
function.  It is worth noting, however, that a mandatory EMS and associated 
requirements based on EMAS would of course require some more obvious 
modification in view of EMASÕ voluntary nature. EMAS registration acts like a Ôgold 
starÕ for environmental performance; firms seek registration as a way in which to 
differentiate themselves from competitors on the basis of environmental excellence. As 
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such, certain aspects of EMAS would be inappropriate within a mandatory regime.68  
Legislation could, however, provide for the acknowledgement of exceptional 
performance,69 and thus some of the competitive advantage associated with EMAS 
could be maintained.  And of course, companies could still apply for EMAS 
registration itself, which would continue to run alongside a mandatory regime. 
 For both practical and symbolic reasons, the responsibility for Ôinstituting and 
ensuring the proper implementation of an environmental management systemÕ should 
be mandated via the existing codified regime of directorsÕ duties. Numerous strands of 
research confirm that top management and, in particular, directors, are crucial as 
regards their influence over corporate cultures.  As was mentioned above, the 
hierarchical aspects of organisations have the potential to mute environmental voice.  
Such an obligation imposed at the apex of the corporation would lend support and 
weight to the EMS, and provide a legal incentive for leadership to ensure that the 
implementation and operation of a management system is taken seriously throughout 
the organisation.70 
 However, the environmental process recommended here should be open (rather 
than closed) to the possibility of tensions between corporate and environmental goals. 
As already explained above, section 172 shuts down these tensions.  Were an EMS 
mandated in an ideal reform environment, references to Ôthe environmentÕ in section 
172 CA 2006 should be entirely omitted from any kind of duty to promote the success 
of the company, or placed on an equal footing with the interests of shareholders. For 
example, section 309 of the (now repealed) UK Companies Act 1985 required 
directors to have regard to the companyÕs employees as well as the interests of 
shareholders.  The phrasing is significant, given that there is at least a semantic 
equality between employees and shareholders, and certainly not the immediately 
noticeable subordinate or instrumental value afforded to stakeholders under section 
172.71  An environmental variant of this duty would potentially allow limited space for 
                                               
68 For example, EMAS registration requires evidence of compliance with environmental law.  This is an 
exacting requirement (regulatory non-compliance is fairly commonplace), and would thus be 
inappropriate within a mandatory regime.  
69 On these types of regulatory approaches, see especially Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders 
and Laggards: Next Generation Environmental Regulation (Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 2002). 
70 DirectorsÕ duties are of course owed to the company. I do not suggest any change to this, and the duty 
could be judicially policed in a similar way to other duties. For example, it is generally recognised that 
the directorsÕ duty of care (CA 2006, s 174), at least in larger companies, imposes significant procedural 
requirements.  While the decided cases tend to deal with financial concerns, the duty requires the 
installation, maintenance and supervision of internal controls over employees and operations.  See, for 
example, In re Barings plc (No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 523 and Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley 
and others [2003] EWHC 2265 (Comm). 
71 There was debate as to the precise effect of s 309.  Some suggested that since section 309 gave Ôno 
indicationÕ that the interests of employees and shareholders were to be weighted differently that 
directors were thus required to balance the interests of employees with those of shareholders.  Others, in 
rejecting any notion of balancing, pointed out that s 309 did not affect the Ôinterests of the companyÕ, 
which continued to be defined by reference to shareholders (see Parkinson, Corporate Power (n 37), pp 
82-5).  
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the expression of internalised or normative environmental value and voice, by 
permitting some environmentally motivated profit sacrificing behaviour.72  This would 
also avoid the problematic business case or Ôwin-winÕ approach associated with section 
172.73  Nonetheless, a mandatory EMS would still offer considerable benefits for intra-
corporate environmental voice, even within these changes, by opening up space within 
the company for its expression.  
 
Possible negative effects and the limits of ÔengineeringÕ environmental voice 
 There are a number of potential objections to mandating EMSs, particularly a 
general concern seen particularly in corporate social responsibility literature that 
ÔcompulsionÕ can be inflexible and even counter-effectual to existing responsibility 
initiatives.74  Kagan, for example, suggests that while mandatory requirements may 
work so as to induce Ôaccountability according to law, they may tend to undercut the 
continuing exercise of responsibility and improvements in performance that the best 
self-regulatory regimes generate.Õ75  On this basis, mandating EMSs may simply 
generate tick-box, formalistic compliance rather than real environmental reflection and 
thinking.76  Relatedly, some argue that the success of EMSs lie in what their otherwise 
ÔvoluntaryÕ, rather than mandatory, uptake implies: true managerial and organisational 
commitment to environmental values.77  In this sense, a voluntary EMS is 
symptomatic of environmental commitment, rather than causative, suggesting in turn 
that mandatory EMSs might be ineffectual in generating pro-environmental voice.  
                                               
72 This would be a defence for directors in that they would be permitted to have regard to the 
environment other than instrumentally for shareholder wealth generation.  Given the limited 
enforcement routes, this would be a ÔshieldÕ for director decision-making rather than a ÔswordÕ for 
potential litigators.  As with s 172, the s 309 duty was owed to the company, so that in turn any wrong 
was against, and the cause of action vested in, the company (on this, see Chapter 5).  Employees 
therefore had no remedy under the provision.  See generally Len S Sealy, ÔDirectorsÕ Wider 
Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and ProceduralÕ (1987) 13 Monash University Law 
Review 164, p 177; Andrew Keay, ÔSection 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an interpretation and 
assessmentÕ [2007] Company Lawyer 106; p 109; Ben Pettet, ÔDuties in Respect of Employees under the 
Companies Act 1980Õ (1981) 34 Current Legal Problems 199, pp 200-4. 
73 As noted by Parkinson, Corporate Power (n 37), p 82, there is ÔinevitablyÕ conflict between the 
interests of employees and shareholders, so that the duty to have regard to employees is not necessarily 
harmonious with, or instrumental to, shareholder wealth generation.  Win-win rhetoric, therefore, did 
not underpin s 309. 
74 Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, ÔManagement-Based Strategies: An Emerging Approach to 
Environmental ProtectionÕ in Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash (eds), Leveraging the Private Sector: 
Management-Based Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance (Washington DC: Resources 
for the Future, 2006), p 19. 
75 Robert A Kagan, ÔAmerican Adversarial Legalism and Intra-Corporate Regulatory SystemsÕ (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Aspen, Colarado (1998)), quoted in 
Coglianese and Nash, ÔEMSs and the New Policy AgendaÕ (n 59), pp 21-2 (original emphasis). 
76 See, for example, Richard MacLean, ÔEnvironmental management systems: do they provide real 
business value?Õ [2004] Environmental Protection 12, p 13; Coglianese, ÔThe Managerial TurnÕ (n 39), 
p 62. 
77 See, for example, Coglianese, ÔThe Managerial TurnÕ (n 39), p 62.  
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 It is true that the EMAS regulation is detailed, but this does not necessarily 
mean that the regime is inflexible.  In accordance with the general thrust of reflexive 
law, there is room for companies to tailor and design their own approaches.  Indeed, as 
already mentioned, a management system will necessarily be idiosyncratic and 
company-specific, and the generation of the environmental policy within EMAS 
allows for a series of self-set targets, allowing corporations to take ownership over 
their environmental processes.78  In this sense, mandating an EMS might be more 
appropriately characterised as facilitative, rather than a form of pure and inflexible 
compulsion typically associated with direct regulation or command and control. 
 Moreover, we ought to be very careful in assuming that ÔvoluntaryÕ uptake is 
symptomatic of a commitment to environmental concerns or an indicator, in and of 
itself, as to the existence of strong environmental voice or advocacy within companies.  
Of course, in some instances, voluntary uptake will equate to this.  But equally, some 
firms adopt EMSs for less palatable reasons of external image manipulation and other 
motivations not easily characterised by normative or internalised commitments to the 
environment.79  In addition, that some firms have differing takes on the values and 
goals underpinning environmental regulation (ranging between hostility; reluctant, 
ritualistic or formalistic acceptance; and embedded, internalised or ÔspiritÕ oriented 
compliance) is a criticism which applies to all types of EMSs indiscriminately, 
voluntary or mandatory, and indeed, to all forms of environmental law.80 
 That an EMS will be unable to engineer or create pro-environmental corporate 
voice is a more valid criticism. However, this is not quite the argument being made 
here.  As mentioned above, the starting point in locating intra-corporate environmental 
voice is to look to the individuals who comprise business organisations.  There is some 
evidence to suggest that these real individuals are environmentally conscious.  There 
are ÔwhispersÕ of environmental voice; the problem is that they are potentially muted 
by organisation and hierarchical constraints.  As such, my argument is not that EMSs 
will manufacture corporate environmental voice.  Rather, the various iterative 
processes of an EMS, implicating a range of employees across the organisation, have 
the potential to open up a deliberative space within companies for environmental 
concerns to be vocalised.  In this sense, an EMS amplifies whispers of environmental 
                                               
78 Indeed, one of the virtues of EMSs over traditional regulation is that they are Ôadaptable to the 
organisations that create and use themÕ, see Coglianese and Nash, ÔEMSs and the New Policy AgendaÕ 
(n 59), p 4. 
79 See, for example, Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, ÔBolstering Private Environmental 
ManagementÕ (2001) (http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=266685) on the limits of the mere presence of an 
EMS as an appropriate metric for differentiating among firms. 
80 See, for example, Robert A Kagan and John T Scholz, ÔThe ÒCriminology of the CorporationÓÕ in 
Keith Hawkins and John Thomas (eds), Enforcing Regulation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 
1984); Gunningham et al, Shades of Green (n 9); Gary Lynch-Wood and David Williamson, ÔThe 
Receptive Capacity of FirmsÑWhy Differences MatterÕ (2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 383 
and Coglianese and Nash, ÔBolstering Private Environmental ManagementÕ (n 79), pp 8-9 outlining a 
range of potential reactions to mandatory EMSs. 
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voice within the company, rather than engineering voice or pro-environmental 
behaviour more generally.  Awrey, Blair and Kershaw make a similar argument 
regarding personal ethics in the context of financial irresponsibility; procedural 
regulation, they suggest, may give personal ethics the room they need to ÔbreatheÕ.81  
At the very least, it is arguable that an EMS, in the salience it affords to environmental 
concerns, opens up this space to a greater extent than the loose environmental 
procedures currently mandated within UK company law.    
 Indeed, if UK legislation were silent as to environmental matters (as was the 
case pre-2006), the case for mandatory EMSs might be weaker.  However, as I have 
argued elsewhere, section 172, far from being a positive development from an 
environmental perspective, is actually a retrograde step which we might have been 
better offer without.82  It seems only appropriate that the integration of environmental 
concerns to corporate decision-making be done properly.  But by mandating a 
procedural business case for the environment, section 172 provides only a weak form 
of environmental integration, and fosters rhetoric to the effect that environmental and 
corporate goals can be easily reconciled.  Mandatory EMSs of course are no panacea.  
For all the reasons above, however, they are superior to the current state of affairs. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I propose that the responsibility for instituting and ensuring the proper 
implementation of an environmental management system ought to be made mandatory 
via the codified regime of directorsÕ duties.  The aim of a mandatory EMS would be to 
open up a deliberative space within companies for the expression of environmental 
concerns, or what I termed the amplification of intra-corporate environmental voice.  
Mandatory EMSs could also achieve more meaningful integration of environmental 
concerns within company law.   
The idea of a voice for the environment reflects the fact that, unlike other 
corporate stakeholders, the environment is unable to advocate for itself. We can hear 
whispers of this voice within companies via the environmental compliance literature, 
where normative or internalised commitments to environmental protection on the part 
of individuals are found to exist.  However, it seems likely that a range of 
organisational and hierarchical factors within businesses can serve to ÔmuteÕ a number 
of non-financial, privately held values, including those relating to the environment. 
Procedural law, particularly forms that subscribe to Christine ParkerÕs prescriptions, 
has the potential open up room within companies for the amplification of this voice. 
                                               
81 Dan Awrey, William Blair, and David Kershaw, ÔBetween Law and Markets: Is There a Role for 
Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?Õ (2012) 38 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (available at 
SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2157588), p 4. 
82 Bradshaw, ÔThe Environmental BusinessÕ (n 2). 
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However, such interventions must be geared towards environmental rather 
corporate/financial norms and outcomes, as well as being open to deliberative 
consideration of the potential conflicts and tensions between these goals. Section 
172(1)(d) CA 2006, by procedurally mandating the business case for environmental 
responsibility, not only fails to institute a procedure geared to an environmental norm, 
but supresses a range of existing and deeply embedded corporate/environmental 
tensions, conflicts and trade-offs.  As such, section 172 is more likely to mute, rather 
than amplify, any existing whispers of intra-corporate environmental voice. 
Environmental management systems, in contrast, would appear to have much 
to offer.  The recursive and iterative processes required by the EUÕs Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme are geared towards self-set environmental goals, and open to 
tensions between these and corporate/financial imperatives. Indeed, emerging 
empirical evidence suggests that these types of processes provide more salience or 
weight to environmental concerns within company decision-making than would have 
been the case without an EMS. Whilst mandatory EMSs are of course no panacea, they 
would seem to offer considerable potential for the amplification of environmental 
concerns within companies, certainly when compared with the existing 
ÔenvironmentalÕ procedures under the UK Companies Act.  Were companies 
legislation silent as to environmental matters, then the case for EMSs might be weaker.  
However, given calls made for environmental integration within company law, it 
seems only appropriate that this is done properly and robustly, and not in the 
somewhat weak manner under section 172 of the Companies Act.  
